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ABDICATION BY ANOTHER NAME: AN ODE TO LOU FISHER 
NEAL DEVINS* 
Let me start with a confession.  I find it a bit daunting to write a response 
to Lou Fisher’s War and Spending Prerogatives: Stages of Congressional 
Abdication.1  Nineteen years ago, while working on a law school seminar 
paper on budget policy, I took a chance and wrote Lou Fisher, one of the 
leading scholars in the field.  Lou took an interest in the paper and in me.  Five 
years later, an evolved version of that seminar paper and a paper I coauthored 
with Lou on the item veto helped convince the William and Mary law school 
to take a gamble and hire me.  Over the past fifteen years, I have had numerous 
occasions to critique Lou’s works.  But these critiques were written for an 
audience of one. 
After this build up (suggesting that I am going into attack dog mode), I am 
about to let the audience down.  I agree with an awful lot of what Lou has to 
say about the critical role that institutional competition plays in our system of 
government and, with it, the horrible price our nation pays when members of 
Congress place self interest ahead of all else.  At the same time, Lou goes too 
far in arguing that Congress has abdicated core powers and, in so doing, placed 
democracy and self government at risk.2 
* * * 
No doubt, were the power of the purse and the power to declare war 
transferred to the President, Congress’s ability to protect itself from outside 
“encroachments” would be jeopardized.3  Indeed, stated at this level of 
generality, pro-executive scholars would join ranks with Lou Fisher in arguing 
that Congressional abdication of its war and appropriations powers would 
undermine the separation of powers.4 
 
* Goodrich Professor of Law, College of William and Mary.  This observation is an outgrowth of 
comments made at the “Congress: Does It Abdicate Power?”  Symposium, St. Louis University 
School of Law.  Thanks to Joel Goldstein for inviting me to the Conference. 
 1. Louis Fisher, War and Spending Prerogatives: Stages of Congressional Abdication,  19 
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7 (2000). 
 2. Id. at 7. 
 3. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 356.  (James Madison) (B. Wright ed., 1961).  For the 
framers: “Ambition must be made to counter ambition.” Id. 
 4. Consider, for example, John Yoo, a scholar whose arguments resonate with defenders of 
a strong presidency.  Although claiming that Congress’s power to declare war has nothing to do 
with the waging of war (including the decision to start a war), Yoo also argues that “the Framers 
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But how does one define abdication?5 Does it require Congress — through 
a constitutional amendment proposal — to formally transfer core legislative 
responsibilities to the President?  Alternatively, is it enough for Congress to 
enact legislation which shifts some legislative power to the President?  What 
then of custom, say Congress’s practice of deferring to presidential military 
initiatives?  Finally, what about instances where Congress utilizes budgetary 
procedures which may result in its following the President’s lead?  For 
example, did Congress abdicate power when it centralized budgetary 
policymaking and, in so doing, embraced supply side economics during the 
Reagan years? 
For Lou Fisher, I think, the answer to all these questions is “yes.”  All of 
these categories are referred to in his paper as manifestations of Congress’s 
abdication of its appropriations and war powers.  Lou makes several nice 
points in advancing his argument, especially when it comes to Congressional 
war powers. But Lou’s definition of abdication, ultimately, is too expansive.  It 
discounts the ways that Congress participates in these disputes.  Consider, for 
example, budgetary policymaking.  In here, Congress’s institutional interests 
and the individual interests of its members are often aligned.  Congress 
remains a vital force in shaping budgetary policy.  In contrast, the individual 
and institutional interests of Congress are rarely aligned on war powers.  
Consequently, I think, presidents are able to run roughshod over the 
constitutional design (although not quite as rough shod as Lou would have us 
believe). 
I. THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVANTAGE 
Presidential power is much more than the “power to persuade.”6 Thanks to 
the singularity of the office, Presidents are well positioned to advance their 
interests before Congress, the nation, and the world.  Critics of the modern day 
presidency, including Theodore Lowi and Jeffrey Tullis, put it this way: 
“[R]egularly ‘go[ing] over the heads’ of Congress to the people at large,” the 
powers of the American people have been invested in a single office,  “making 
 
intended Congress to participate in war-making by controlling appropriations.” John C. Yoo, The 
Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. 
L. REV. 167, 295 (1996). 
 5. Commenting on “Congressional Abdication: War and Spending Powers,” a paper that 
Lou presented at St. Louis University last year, Doug Williams provided an insightful discussion 
of how the line separating delegation (something that Lou considers an essential part of modern 
government) and abdication “remains blurred.”  Douglas R. Williams, Demonstrating and 
Explaining Congressional Abdication: Why Does Congress Abdicate Power?, 49 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 1013, 1014 (1999). 
 6. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENCY, at X 
(1960). 
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[it] the most powerful office in the world.”7  Even defenders of presidential 
power recognize that Presidents are motivated to seek power and have the tools 
to accomplish the task.  “The opportunities for presidential imperialism are too 
numerous to count” according to Terry Moe and William Howell, “because, 
when presidents feel it is in their political interests, they can put whatever 
decisions they like to strategic use, both in gaining policy advantage and in 
pushing out the boundaries of their power.”8 
When presidents act, moreover, it is up to the other branches to respond.  
In other words, presidents often win by default — either because Congress 
chooses not to respond or its response is ineffective.  Furthermore, by end 
running the burdensome and ofttimes unsuccessful strategy of seeking 
legislative authorization, unilateral presidential action expands the institutional 
powers and prerogatives of the presidency.  In other words, the President’s 
personal interests and the presidency’s institutional interests are often one and 
the same.  Witness, for example, executive orders: between 1973 and 1998, 
presidents issued roughly 1,000 executive orders.  Only thirty-seven of these 
orders were challenged in Congress.  More striking, only three of these 
challenges resulted in legislation.9 
Presidents, of course, sometimes need Congress to enact legislation.  When 
Bill Clinton introduced his health care initiative, its fate rested in the hands of 
Congress.  Here, Congress had the upper hand.  Rather than having to do battle 
with the President on his own field (enacting legislation that is subject to a 
presidential veto), it is up to the President to overcome the burden of inertia —
cajoling Congress into action.  As such, modern day presidents often advance 
their agenda through unilateral action, not legislative strategies.10 
Unlike the presidency, the individual and institutional interests of members 
of Congress are often in conflict with one another.  While each of Congress’s 
535 members has some stake in Congress as an institution, parochial interests 
will overwhelm this collective good.  In particular, members of Congress need 
to be reelected to advance their (and their constituents’) interests.  For this 
reason, lawmakers are “trapped in a prisoners’ dilemma: all might benefit if 
they could cooperate in defending or advancing Congress’s power, but each 
has a strong incentive to free ride in favor of the local constituency.”11 
 
 7. JEFFREY K. TULLIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 4 (1987); THEODORE J. LOWI, THE 
PERSONAL PRESIDENT: POWER INVESTED, PROMISE UNFULFILLED, at x-xi (1985). 
 8. Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J. 
L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 138 (1999). 
 9. Id. at 165-66. 
 10. See generally RICHARD NATHAN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY (1983).  See also 
NEAL DEVINS, SHAPING CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES: ELECTED GOVERNMENT, THE SUPREME 
COURT, AND THE ABORTION DEBATE 97-120 (1996) (commenting on abortion). 
 11. Moe & Howell, supra note 8, at 144. 
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Nowhere is the gap between presidential and legislative incentives starker 
than war powers.  To start with, as Lou Fisher and others have shown, the 
constitutional design envisions (at a minimum) a significant congressional 
role.12  Notwithstanding this clear constitutional mandate, Congress has very 
little incentive to play a leadership role.  “Rather than opposing the President 
on a potential military action,” members of Congress “find it more convenient 
to acquiesce and avoid criticism that they obstructed a necessary mission.”13 
Presidents, in contrast, often have strong incentives to launch military 
strikes.  Presidents achieve status, fame if you will, by leading the nation into 
battle.14  Unwilling to overcome the burden of inertia and rein in the President, 
Congress typically stands by on the sidelines (or worse yet proclaims that the 
President is the sole organ of military affairs).15  In this way, the institutional 
powers of the President expand through every fame-inducing exercise of self 
interest. 
II. RETHINKING THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVANTAGE 
The singularity of the office (combined with the tools to execute, that is, 
put programs into effect) allows presidents to take unilateral action.  But 
presidents oft times are dependent on other parts of the government and the 
people.  When this happens, the individual interests of the President may 
conflict with the institutional interests of the presidency.  In such battles, 
presidents invariably place their own interests ahead of the institution. 
Take the case of George Bush, a president who launched an 
“unprecedented effort to implement a serious and systematic legal strategy for 
 
 12. See generally LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER  (1995); JOHN HART ELY, 
WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH  
(1993); W. TAYLOR REVELEY III, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: WHO 
HOLDS THE ARROWS AND OLIVE BRANCHES? (1992).  Indeed, legal academics who served as 
presidential appointee’s in the Justice Department’s Office for Legal Counsel do not disagree 
with this claim.  See, e.g., John O. McGinnis, The Spontaneous Order of War Powers, 47 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 1317, 1327 n.36 (1997); William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the 
Power to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 695 (1997); Walter Dellinger, After the Cold War: 
Presidential Power and the Use of Military Force, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 107 (1995).  But see H. 
Jefferson Powell, The Founders and The President’s Authority Over Foreign Affairs, 40 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1471 (1999). 
 13. FISHER, supra note 12, at 1006.  See also Dante Fascell, War Powers and Congress, 50 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 121, 124 (1995) (commenting on leadership in Congress). 
 14. For this very reason, the framers intended that Congress play the dominant role in 
initiating military actions.  See Treanor, supra note 12. 
 15. Presidents likewise have succeeded in side-stepping the Constitution’s demand that 
Congress ratifies treaties.  Specifically, by negotiating agreements with foreign nations (executive 
agreements), presidents accomplish through unilateral action what might not be accomplished 
through the constitutional design.  See also Moe & Howell, supra note 8, at 163-64. 
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the defense of the presidency.”16  Notwithstanding this effort, the Bush 
administration regularly sacrificed institutional interests in order to advance 
incremental policy objectives.  To quiet a controversy in Congress over 
Reagan administration efforts to kill affirmative action, for example, the Bush 
administration did not exercise its authority to speak the Federal 
Communications Commission’s voice before the Supreme Court.  Instead, it 
cut a deal to allow the Commission to represent itself. As a result, while 
Commission attorneys vigorously defended race preferences, the Solicitor 
General (representing the United States) filed an amicus brief challenging the 
constitutionality of Commission policies.17  Far more significant, through the 
so-called “Baker accord,” four committees of Congress as well as party leaders 
were given veto power over the fractious issue of funding the Nicaraguan 
Contras.18  Although White House counsel C. Boyden Gray objected to this 
level of involvement by Congress in foreign policy, especially through what 
seemed to him an unconstitutional legislative veto, the President cared more 
about funding the Contras than defending his institutional prerogatives.19 
The Baker Accord is telling for other reasons.  It calls attention to 
Congress’s penchant for reactive “fire alarm” oversight.  As public choice 
theory suggests, lawmakers often devise legislation at the behest of powerful 
interest groups.  When there is a dominant interest group, legislation will often 
specify the devilish details of administration.  Yet, since the details of 
administration cannot always be anticipated (when there is a dominant group) 
and since interest groups often compete with each other, legislation is often 
ambiguous.  As such, oversight enables lawmakers to respond to ongoing 
constituency pressures.  In other words, lawmakers, by necessity and design, 
may well establish “a system of rules, procedures, and informal practices that 
enable individual citizens and organized interest groups to examine 
administrative decisions (sometimes in prospect), charge executive agencies 
with violating congressional goals, and seek remedies from agencies, courts, 
and Congress itself.”20 
 
 16. Nelson Lund, Lawyers and the Defense of the Presidency, 1995 BYU L. REV. 17, 21 
(1995). 
 17. This episode is recounted in Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor 
General Control of Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 255, 293-97(1994). 
 18. See generally LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL 
FOR IRAN/CONTRA MATTERS (1988); William Safire, Taking Baker to the Cleaners, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 21, 1990, at A21. 
 19. See David Hoffman & Ann Devroy, Bush Counsel Contest Contra Aid Plan; Gray Feels 
Pact with Congress May Infringe on Presidential Power, WASHINGTON POST, March 26, 1989, at 
A5; Lund, supra note 16, at 64-66. 
 20. Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: 
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984).  See also Harold H. 
Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEX. L. REV. 207 (1984). 
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Witness the “Baker Accord.”  Rather than reach a firm decision on how 
much aid could go to the Contras, Congress established procedures which 
allowed it to play a reactive role.21  If constituency pressures supported 
continuing funding, the committees would not exercise their veto.  If 
continuing funding proved politically problematic, however, the committees 
could exercise their veto without having to do battle with the White House.  In 
so doing, Congress minimized the cost of decision making. 
Another example of reactive congressional oversight is appropriations 
riders.  By forbidding the expenditure of appropriations on activities that 
Congress disapproves of, appropriation riders allow Congress to derail 
presidential initiatives (without enacting freestanding legislation setting forth 
congressional policy).22  Typically, riders limit domestic policy initiatives.  But 
Congress has also limited military initiatives this way, most notably during the 
Vietnam War.23 
Here, I think, is where Lou may overstate his claim about Congress’s 
abdication of war making power.  First, rather than play no role, Congress may 
prefer to play a reactive role.24  In particular, through appropriations, treaty 
ratifications, confirmations, and other types of oversight, Congress is very 
much in the business of shaping military strategy.25  Second, when there is a 
real risk of significant casualties, Presidents may well turn to Congress for 
authorization.  The “contemporary President,” as Lou observes in his paper, is 
well equipped to wage war without Congressional authorization because 
“military technology now enables Presidents to wage war with few 
casualties.”26  Indeed, not a single U.S. casualty resulted from either 1998 air 
strikes against Iraq or the 1999 attacks against Serbia.  Under these 
circumstances, Presidents can wage little wars without fearing the ire of a 
reactive Congress. 
 
 21. See WALSH, supra note 18. 
 22. See generally Neal Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies through Limitation 
Riders, 1987 DUKE L.J. 456 (1987). 
 23. See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1312-14 (2d Cir. 1973) (discussing 
congressional attempts to limit authorization of bombing in Cambodia), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 
936 (1974). 
 24. This is not to say, however, that Congress does not pay a heavy price for playing a 
reactive, not leadership, role.  Aside from making a mockery of the Framers’ design, Congress 
may find it difficult to intercede.  For example, the impulse to rally round the troops may translate 
into ineffectual oversight.  Lou’s chronicling of Congress’s ever diminishing role in war powers 
buttresses this conclusion. 
 25. A recent example is the Senate’s rejection of a treaty banning the testing of nuclear 
weapons.  See Eric Schmitt, Senate Kills Test Ban Treaty in Crushing Loss for Clinton, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 14, 1999, at A1.  Moreover, through its confirmation power, Congress (especially 
during the Clinton years) has affected military policymaking.  See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE 
FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (forthcoming). 
 26. See Fisher, supra note 1, at 50. 
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In contrast, Presidents may see the need to seek congressional approval 
when American lives are on the line.  For example, notwithstanding all his 
bravado, George Bush did seek Congressional approval before going to war 
against Iraq.  Here, the President may fear being blamed for recklessly 
endangering American lives and, as such, may seek cover in congressional 
action.27  Needless to say, the President’s dominant role in military affairs, 
party loyalty, and the President’s ability to send a singular message to the 
people (through press coverage and speeches) will probably allow the 
President to get his way with Congress.28  Nevertheless, I would draw a line 
between presidential advantage and congressional abdication. 
III. THE CONGRESSIONAL ADVANTAGE 
What then about the budget?  Here, the institutional interests of Congress 
and the self interests of its members should coalesce.  Specifically, members 
have a strong interest in rewarding their constituents through appropriations.  
And when members of Congress control the appropriations process, well, the 
power of Congress itself is strengthened.  Moreover, unlike military strikes 
(where the President can act without Congressional authorization), Congress 
cannot be shut out of the appropriations process.  It must enact a budget.  In 
other words, the President’s agenda control advantage on budgetary matters is, 
at best, a muted one. 
So much for theory.  According to Lou, Congress has abdicated its control 
over the appropriations process.  In support of this proposition, Lou cites the 
following evidence: (1) Members of Congress depict themselves as budget 
dunces and, more significantly, have enacted legislation (Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings; Line Item Veto Act of 1996) which formally transfers some of their 
appropriations power; (2) Presidents, although submitting budgets at least as 
large as Congress, have waged a successful rhetorical campaign in which they 
depict themselves as committed to fiscal restraint; (3) Centralization in 
budgeting — an outgrowth of the Budget Act of 1974 — has both advantaged 
the President in his negotiations with Congress and contributed to run away 
budget deficits. 
 
 27. As Lou points out, Bush claimed both that he did not need Congressional authorization 
and that, if Congress turned him down, he would have ordered troops into combat.  See Fisher, 
supra note 1, at 27-28.  I place little stock in these post-hoc claims.  Had Congress voted him 
down, I suspect that Bush would have found the cost of waging war on his own authority too 
great. 
 28. Indeed, the more Congress defers to presidential initiatives, the harder it is for Congress 
to resist such presidential entreaties.  Why?  Well, Congress, the press, the people, and the 
President come to see war making as an executive function.  See FISHER, supra note 12, at 980-83 
(the press); id. at 977-80 (the Congress); Fisher, supra note 1, at 49 (the people); id. at 51-53 (the 
President). 
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Each of these three charges is significant and, I think, that Lou has done a 
good job in supporting each of these claims.  But I do not think that Lou has 
shown that Congress has abdicated its authority on budgetary matters.  To 
begin with, Congress, its appropriations committees, and its members are very 
much engaged in budgetary policy making.  Although the Budget Act of 1974 
embraced centralizing procedures (the creation of both the Congressional 
Budget Office and Budget Committees to oversee the budget process), power 
was not formally transferred from existing authorization, appropriations, or 
tax-writing committees.29  Moreover, powerful members of Congress are well 
served by centralization.  For example, in working out the specific terms of 
omnibus appropriations bills, the status and authority of party leaders is 
enhanced.  Finally, presidential participation in budget summits, negotiations 
over the terms of omnibus and other appropriations measures, and the like is 
very much tied to the President’s veto power.  In other words, the 
constitutional design envisions a significant presidential role in budgetary and 
other lawmaking. 
None of this is to suggest that the budget process works well.  It may be 
that centralization in budgeting encourages Congress and the President to build 
their budget proposals around unrealistic assumptions and, in so doing, 
contributes to the national debt.30  Also, while Presidents often make 
concessions to Congress in their budget negotiations, centralization makes it 
easier for the President to shape the budget.  In FY 1988, for example, Ronald 
Reagan used his veto threat to preserve funds for anti-abortion counseling and 
for foreign assistance.  More significant, Reagan pushed through a provision 
on Contra aid and the withdrawal of language codifying the fairness doctrine.  
Reagan, however, did have to swallow $23 billion in tax increases.31 
Effective presidential leadership in negotiating the terms of budget 
agreements seems a far cry from the outright transfer of Congress’s power of 
the purse.  What then of the 1985 Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act and the Line 
Item Veto Act of 1996?  Here, Congress did seem to relinquish some control of 
its budget making authority. 
Under Gramm-Rudman, Congress proved it was no longer willing to trust 
either its own internal budgetary process or the President’s.  Through an 
automatic sequestration procedure, Congress sought to ensure that the budget 
conformed to statutorily specified deficit reduction targets.32  With deficit 
targets, automatic sequestration, and a formal OMB role in projecting deficits, 
 
 29. See ALLEN SCHICK, CONGRESS AND MONEY: BUDGETING, SPENDING, AND TAXING 78 
(1980). 
 30. See Fisher, supra note 1, at 39, 60; Neal Devins, Budget Reform and the Balance of 
Powers, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 393 (1990). 
 31. See Janet Hook, Budget Deal Enacted at Last, Congress Adjourns, 45 CONG. Q. WKLY. 
REP. 3183 (1987). 
 32. In 1990, deficit targets were abandoned in favor of caps on spending and increased taxes. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000] ABDICATION BY ANOTHER NAME 73 
Gramm-Rudman certainly constrained Congressional discretion in budgeting.  
But Gramm-Rudman did not alter the fundamental budgetary balance of 
power: Congress helped set deficit reduction targets, it specified that the 
sequestration apply to both domestic and foreign spending, it exempted a 
number of social programs from the sequestration process, and it delegated 
much of the Act’s implementation to an officer of Congress (the Comptroller 
General).33  Moreover, in an effort to protect their spending priorities, 
appropriations committees and subcommittees worked hard to end run Gramm-
Rudman’s byzantine structure.34  With that said, Congress’s repeated claims 
that it could not be trusted to keep its fiscal house in order set the stage for item 
veto legislation. 
At first blush, the Line Item Veto Act looks like a wholesale abdication of 
Congress’s power of the purse.  By allowing the President to rescind 
appropriations, Congress seemed to transfer its power both to set expenditure 
levels (Presidential rescissions effectively reduce appropriations levels) and 
budget priorities (the President could veto programs he disfavored while 
leaving untouched programs he favored).  In practice, however, the item veto 
was more bark than bite.  First, by identifying program priorities in unofficial 
and informal documents, Congress could communicate its preferences to 
agencies without subjecting its handiwork to presidential cancellations.  Since 
agencies are unlikely to risk retaliation in subsequent legislative cycles, this 
informal mechanism would work as well as either statutory or committee 
report specifications.35  Second, the aggressive use of rescission authority is not 
in the President’s self interest (even if it enhances the power of the 
presidency).  Congressional and interest group pressure would make it 
politically costly for the President to do more than tinker at the margins.  In 
particular, since any rescinded appropriation would go into a lockbox for 
deficit reduction, presidents could not shift funds (and thereby reward political 
allies or constituent interests).  As such, presidents risk making enemies and 
little else by invoking their cancellation authority.36  Bill Clinton’s cautious use 
of Item Veto Act authority bears this out.37 
 
 33. For this reason, the original statute was struck down because it undermined the 
President’s power to implement the law.  Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
 34. See Louis Fisher, Continuing Resolutions: Can’t Live With ‘em, Can’t Live Without ‘em, 
48 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 101 (1988). 
 35. See generally Neal Devins, In Search of the Lost Chord: Reflections on the 1996 Item 
Veto Act, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1605 (1997); Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability and Restraint: 
The Federal Budget Process and the Line Item Veto Act, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 871 (1999). 
 36. Mike Fitts takes this point one step further and argues that the singular nature of the 
presidency can, in fact, limit presidential power.  See Michael A Fitts, The Paradox of Power in 
the Modern State: Why a Unitary, Centralized, Presidency May Not Exhibit Effective or 
Legitimate Leadership, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 827, 895 (1996). 
 37. Would this caution have continued?  I think so.  With the Supreme Court’s invalidation 
of the statute we will never know.  See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1997). 
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Gramm-Rudman and item veto legislation, at the same time, make clear 
that Congress is willing to forfeit some of its appropriations power.  
Apparently, members are willing to trade off some institutional power in order 
to reap the gains of telling the nation that they are serious about the deficit.  At 
the same time, neither Gramm-Rudman nor item veto legislation formally 
limits the power of individual members of Congress to reward their 
constituents. In this way, while these bills suggest a willingness to diminish its 
power of the purse, Congress very much cares about its power to reward 
constituents through appropriations.  For this reason, I think Lou goes too far 
in suggesting that these measures are proof positive that Congress has 
abdicated its appropriations power. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is time to wrap up: Lou Fisher has done a wonderful job in calling 
attention to ways in which core Congressional powers have diminished in 
recent decades.  But Lou’s proof is of diminished power, not power transferred 
to the President.  With that said, for our system of checks and balances to 
work, Congress must step up to the plate and reassert its institutional priorities.  
Otherwise, there is a risk — especially in war powers — that the constitutional 
division of power and, with it, the Constitution itself will eventually become 
irrelevant. 
 
